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Valorization Addendum
This addendum discusses the knowledge valorization generated by the chapters of the dis-
sertation.
According to the report of the National Valorization Committee,
"knowledge valorization means the process of creating value from knowledge,
by making knowledge suitable and/or available for social (and/or economic)
use and bymaking it suitable for translation into competing products, services,
processes and new activities."
Examples of social (and/or economic) value creation from research results can be very
different from each other depending on the disciplines: licences, open source tools, soft-
ware, co-publications with social and/or economic stakeholders, publications in journals
and newspapers, non-academic publications, appearances in the media, contributions to
public debates, advice for social organisations or companies, policy advice for govern-
ments and training programmes for professionals.
Of the item listed above, the only one that is directly applicable to the present work is
"publications in journals". The paper based upon Chapter 2 was published at Econometrica
in 2019. The paper based upon Chapter 3 was published at Theory and Decision in 2019.
The paper based upon Chapter 4 has been submitted to an A journal. However, given the
theoretical nature of the dissertation, other opportunities of valorization are merely spec-
ulative. Theory is, by its nature, abstract and provides a selective and one-sided account
of the many-sided concrete social world.
Theory and research are strongly interrelated. For example, theory enables us to con-
nect a single study to the immense base of knowledge to which other researchers con-
tribute. The framework and results contained in Chapter 2 are exactly in this spirit: at first
glance, indeed, literature on coalition formation theory seems particularly fragmented:
coalition formation theory belongs to cooperative game theory aswell as to non-cooperative
game theory. Furthermore, a coalition formation process can be studied by exploiting a
variety of settings and solution concepts. In Chapter 2, we provide a new tool which
unifies and generalizes different previous results in this area of research. The most inter-
esting feature of this new tool concerns its capability of providing a prediction even in
those scenarios where standard tools fail. An example is given by Chapter 3 which stud-
ies a Bertrand duopoly with different costs. It is well known that if prices can be any real
number a solution in pure strategies does not exists. Despite the popularity of Bertrand
duopoly, the set of mixed-stategies Nash equilibria has not been fully characterized, but,
infinitely many equilibria exist. We obtain a unique prediction both when predatory pric-
ing is allowed and when it is forbidden by law. An implication of our results is that when
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predatory pricing is forbidden, the market price is predicted to be weakly lower than in
mixed strategies Nash equilibria.
Chapter 4 is in line with a rising literature in coalition formation theory which studies
how social norm an behavioural preferences can affect democratic institutions. In partic-
ular we study coalition formation among heterogeneous individuals who care not only
about their absolute economic gain but also about their relative economic position within
the group they belong to. We consider competitive societies in which the surplus of a
coalition is split according to productivity and egalitarian societies in which coalitions
split their surplus equally. Both competitive and egalitarian societies lead to segregated
partition structures. For competitive societies, all stable allocations are based on bottom-
up segregation, i.e., individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions and if some
individuals are not part of a productive coalition, then these are themost productive ones.
For egalitarian societies, we obtain top-down segregation in all stable allocations. Again
it holds that individuals with adjacent productivities form coalitions, but now the least
productive individuals may not be part of any productive coalition. In both society, if an
allocation is not segregated then there exists a sequence of coalitional deviations which
lead to a segregated allocation.
However, despite all my effort to extract a social or economic value from these results,
I cannot really foresee the direct and indirect implication for the society. In my defence, I
would like to conclude this valorization addendum borrowing the words of John von Neu-
mann, one of the greatest scientist of all times:
"A large part of mathematics which becomes useful developed with absolutely no desire
to be useful, and in a situation where nobody could possibly know in what area it would
become useful; and there were no general indications that it ever would be so."
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